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Abstract
We provide a result for non-emptiness of the core in NTU games. We use a payos-
dependent balancedness condition, based on transfer rate mappings. Going beyond
the non-emptiness of standard core, existence of some rened solution is proved,
including specic core allocations and equilibrium-core allocations in parameterized
collection of cooperative games. The proofs borrow mathematical tools and geomet-
ric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications
to various extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.
JEL classication: C60, C62, C71, D50, D51.
Key words: cooperative games, balancedness, non-emptiness, core concepts,
parameterized collections of games.
1 Introduction
The core of an n-person cooperative game is the set of feasible outcomes that
cannot be improved by any coalition of players. The stability of a model where
social interactions are at stake is guaranteed when the core is non empty.
Bondareva-Shapley's result states that the core of a TU game is non empty if
and only if the game is balanced and Scarf's theorem states that the core of
a NTU balanced game is non-empty.
Several improvements have been made since Scarf's result, but the balanced-
ness conditions in the literature always rely on the same principle. Let us rst
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can be made from one player to another at a constant one-to-one rate. Then,
a transfer rate vector is naturally associated to each coalition. The vector is
dened as the vector whose coordinates are 1 for the members of the coalition
and 0 for the other players. Given these transfer rate vectors, a family of coali-
tions is balanced if the transfer rate vector of the grand coalition is positively
generated by the transfer rate vectors of the coalitions in the family. Then the
TU game is balanced if any feasible payo for a balanced family is feasible for
the grand coalition.
For NTU games, the transfer rate vector can be dened but it does not always
correspond to a feasible transfer among the members of the coalition. Nev-
ertheless, the balancedness condition remains sucient for the non-emptiness
of the core. Billera (1970) generalizes Scarf's result by considering transfer
rate vectors with any positive coordinates. In this paper, we allow the transfer
rates to depend on the payos instead of being constant. Consequently, the no-
tion of balanced family of coalitions depends on a given payo and the notion
leads naturally to the denition of a payos-dependent balanced game. We will
show how our notion incorporates previous notions, including: the standard
notion of balancedness (Scarf, 1967); b-balancedness (Billera, 1970); balanced-
ness for convex games (Billera, 1970); (b;<)-balanced condition (Keiding and
Thorlund-Petersen, 1987).
Independently of our work, Predtetchinski and Herings (2002) dene the class
of -balanced games, which is identical to the class of payos-dependent bal-
anced games. They proved that the condition is not only sucient for non-
emptiness of the core in NTU games but also necessary. Thus, they character-
ize core non-emptiness in NTU games, in the likeness of Bondareva-Shapley's
result for the TU games.
In this paper, using the 
exibility of the payos-dependent balancedness, we
go beyond the non-emptiness of the core. Indeed, payos-dependent balanced-
ness permits a number of results in the literature involving specic core al-
locations. We state in the rst result of this paper, Theorem 3, that in any
payos-dependent balanced game, there exists a core allocation such that an
equilibrium condition is satised with respect to the transfer rate vectors of
the family of coalitions, which are feasible for the core allocation. The result
is very much in the spirit of Reny and Wooders (1996) key lemma, which ex-
hibited a core allocation satisfying an equilibrium condition for credit/debit
mappings. We deduce Reny and Wooders lemma as a corollary of Theorem 3,
the transfer rate rules dening the payos-dependent balancedness will take
into account the individual contributions of the agents within the dierent
coalitions. Problems linked up with fair division schemes are brie
y described
thanks to this approach, namely the partnered core of Reny and Wooders
(1996) and the average prekernel of Orshan and Zarzuelo (2000). As a partic-
2ular case, Theorem 3 also states that any payos-dependent balanced game
has a non-empty core, in the standard sense.
Lastly, we consider a parameterized collection of cooperative games. This is
very much in the spirit of Ichiishi (1981) even if he does not explicitly use
this abstract framework. The stake is the following: the payos sets, taken as
set-valued mappings, depend on parameters which stand for an abstract envi-
ronment; furthermore, one adds an equilibrium condition on the parameters,
which is represented by a set-valued mapping depending on the parameters
and the payos. We dene an equilibrium-core allocation, which is a pair of
a payo and an environment, the payo belonging to the core of the game
associated to the environment, and, the environment being a xed point of
the equilibrium set-valued mapping. We prove the existence of equilibrium-
core allocations, in Theorem 18, under our payo-dependent balancedness
condition. The existence of a Social Coalitional Equilibrium as stated in the
benchmark work of Ichiishi (1981) is a consequence of our result 1 . Let us re-
call that Debreu (1952)'s Social Equilibrium is a particular Social Coalitional
Equilibrium. In economies without ordered preferences, or in economies with
increasing returns, Border (1984) or Ichiishi and Quinzii (1983) did already use
the parametric framework as intermediate steps. We show how these results
can be deduced from Theorem 18.
Since most of our reasonings are deeply impregnated by the theory of gen-
eral equilibrium, the main results are naturally obtained through Kakutani's
xed point theorem 2 . We will also borrow mathematical tools and geomet-
ric constructions from literature on general equilibrium with non-convexities
theory, see Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988, 1991) and Bonnisseau (1997). We
explore shortly the connection between cooperative game theory and Gen-
eral Equilibrium with non convexities theory in Section 2.4. We show in the
proof of Theorem 3, that a core allocation may actually be considered as an
equilibrium of a two production set economy. Moreover, the prices of the pro-
duction equilibria may be restated as transfer rate rules equilibrium satised
by the core allocation. Finally, we keep in mind this duality, putting a light
on the close relationship between the two key assumptions into both theories,
namely balancedness, at stake in cooperative games, and the survival assump-
tion in general equilibrium. Note that Shapley and Vohra (1991) did already
quote similarities between the xed point mappings they use to show the
non-emptiness of the core, and, the xed point mappings at stake in General
1 Note that we limit ourself to a space of environment in a nite dimensional
Euclidean space, whereas Ichiishi considers a locally convex Hausdor topological
vector space.
2 One usually associates the question of non-emptiness of cores with KKMS cover-
ing theorems or Fan's coincidence theorems, but binding the concept of core with
Kakutani's theorem makes sense due to its intimate link with Walrasian economies.
See the discussion about these links in Ichiishi (1993, p.118-125).
3Equilibrium theory 3 . However these authors did not investigate further.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, Theorem 3 states the exis-
tence of specic core allocations in payos-dependent balanced games. Then,
we show how one can deduce number of results involving balancedness. Section
3 is devoted to the model with parameters and its related topics. Under as-
sumption of payos-dependent balancedness, we state a result for the existence
of equilibrium-core allocation in parameterized collection of games, Theorem
18, covering Theorem 3. Quoted examples of applications will follow. In the
body of the paper, the proofs consist mainly of geometric constructions which
are of constant use, the proofs of Theorems and technical lemmas are given
in Appendix. Except for some notations and basic assumptions given below,
Sections 2 and 3 can be taken independently. We discuss the related literature
and possible directions for future works in Section 4.
2 Core solutions in NTU Games
4 Notations. Let N be the nite set of players and N be the non-empty subsets
of N, i.e. the coalitions of players; for each S 2 N, we denote LS the jSj-
dimensional subspace of I RN dened by LS = fx 2 I RN j xi = 0; 8i = 2
Sg, LS+ (LS++) is the non negative orthant (positive orthant) of LS; 1 is
the vector of I RN whose coordinates are equal to 1, 1? is the hyperplane
fs 2 I RN j
P
i2N si = 0g and proj is the orthogonal projection mapping on
1?; if x 2 I RN then xS is the projection of x into LS; for each S 2 N, let
S = cof1fig j i 2 Sg, mS = 1S
jSj and let  be the unit simplex  = N
(++ =  \ I RN
++).
Game description. Each coalition S 2 N has a feasible set of payos or util-
ities, denoted VS  I RN. For all x 2 I RN, S(x) = fS 2 N j x 2 @VSg. W
will denote the union of the payos sets W := [S2NVS. A cooperative game
is denoted (VS;S 2 N). x 2 I RN is called a payo.
Denition 1 Let (VS;S 2 N) be a game. A payo x is in the core of the
game if x 2 VN n int W.
It is worth noting that, in this formulation, the core concept only involves two
sets: a feasible payo for the grand coalition belongs to the core if this payo
lies on the boundary of the whole game. This formulation is crucial in the
remainder of the paper, leading most of our geometric constructions.
3 See Vohra (1988) to convince oneself of this fact for Shapley{Vohra mappings.
4 For any set-valued mapping  , Gr   will denote its graph. For any set Y  I RN,
co(Y ), @Y and int Y will denote respectively its convex hull, boundary and interior.
4We now posit two basic assumptions on the game. The payos sets of any
coalition, ranked as cylinders of I RN for convenience, satisfy the free disposal
assumption (H1), and the boundedness of the individually rational payos of
any coalition of players (H2).
Assumption H1 (i) Vfig, i 2 N, and VN are non-empty.
(ii) For each S 2 N, VS is closed, VS   I RN
+ = VS, VS 6= I RN, and, for all
(x;x0) 2 (I RN)2, if x 2 VS and xS = x0S, then x0 2 VS. 5
Assumption H2 There exists m 2 I R such that for all S 2 N, for all x 2 VS,
if x = 2 int Vfig for all i 2 S, then xi  m.
2.1 The main theorem
Before stating the main result of this section, we note that, under Assump-
tion H1, VN and W satisfy the assumptions of Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988,
Lemma 5.1. p.139). Therefore, there exist continuous mappings pN from I RN
to @VN, pW from I RN to @W, N and W from 1? to I R such that pN(x) =
proj(x)   N(proj(x))1 and the same for W.
We are now in position to dene the notion of payos-dependent balanced
game.
Denition 2 A game (VS;S 2 N) is payos-dependent balanced (with ('S)S2N
and  ) if the following assertion is satised:
There exist, for each S 2 N, a set-valued mapping 'S from @VS to S, which
is upper semi-continuous with non-empty compact and convex values, and, a
set-valued mapping   from @VN to  which is upper semi-continuous with
non-empty compact and convex values such that:
For each x 2 @W, if cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g \  (pN(x)) 6= ;, then x 2 VN.
To give some intuition into this balancedness condition, consider the mappings
('S)S2N and  , as transfer rate rules. For any given ecient payo x of the
coalition S, 'S(x) denes a set of admissible payo rate of transfer between
agents within the coalition. Firstly, note that we dene two transfer rate rules
for the grand coalition, 'N and  . The idea is to make a distinction between
5 Assumption H1 implies that there exists, for each i 2 N, vi 2 I R such that
Vfig = fx 2 I RN j xi  vig. We do not assume the non-emptiness of VS. But if we
put VS := fx 2 I RN j xi  vi;8i 2 Sg for the empty payos sets, then Assumptions
H1 and H2 are satised, all payos sets are non-empty, and, the core is unchanged.
We do not normalize the game as usually done. For instance, in Shapley and Vohra
(1991), the game is normalized without loss of generality by imposing vi > 0 for
each i 2 N.
5the transfer rate rule of the coalition N for coalitional organization and that
used for the stand alone grand coalition; our next result shed a light on the
importance of such a distinction. Secondly, the condition of payos-dependent
balancedness states roughly speaking that: at any given payo x 2 @W, the
hyperplane game, induced by the transfer rates between the players, is bal-
anced. We also point out that the condition needs only to hold on @W, the
(weakly) ecient frontier of the game.
The rst result of the paper is the following. Its proof is referred to Appendix.
Theorem 3 Under Assumptions H1 and H2, in any payos-dependent bal-
anced game (with ('S)S2N and  ), there exists a core allocation x such that:
cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g \  (x) 6= ;:
2.2 About the proof
We brie
y comment the main outline of the proof to emphasize the geomet-
ric intuition which leads our reasonings. We will need an abstract result of
Bonnisseau and Cornet (1991, Theorem 1 p.67), to obtain Theorem 3 as a
corollary of an existence result in General Equilibrium with non convexities
theory.
Before recalling the general equilibrium result, we rst posit some notations.
C is a convex cone with a non-empty interior of I RN
++[f0g and 1 is an element
of the interior of C. H1 is the hyperplane dened by fx 2 I RN j x1 = 1g and
 is the non-empty, compact, convex set H1 \  C where C is the negative
polar cone of C. We only need a weak version with two sets 6 :
Theorem 4 (Bonnisseau{Cornet (1991)) Let Y1 and Y2 two subsets of
I RN. For each j = 1;2, let ~ 'j be a set-valued mapping from @Yj to . We
assume the following assertions:
Assumption P Yj is closed, non-empty and Yj   C = Yj, for each j = 1;2.
Assumption PR ~ 'j is upper semi-continuous with non-empty convex val-
ues, for each j = 1;2.
Assumption BL There exists j 2 I R such that for all yj 2 @Yj, for all
p 2 ~ 'j(yj), p  yj  j, for each j = 1;2.
Assumption B For each t  0, At = f(y1;y2) 2 Y1  Y2 j y1 + y2 + t1 2 Cg
is bounded.
6 We also note at this point that   int  and the Assumption of free disposal
with the set I RN
+ implies free disposal with the cone C, that is Yj  I RN
+ = Yj implies
Yj   C = Yj.
6Assumption S For each t > 0, for each (p;(y1;y2)) 2   @Y1  @Y2, if
p 2 ~ '1(y1) \ ~ '2(y2) and y1 + y2 + t1 2 C, then p  (y1 + y2 + t1) > 0.
Then there exists (y1;y2;p) 2 @Y1  @Y2   such that y1 + y2 2 C and
p 2 ~ '1(y1) \ ~ '2(y2).
In the original statement of Assumption S, one has t  0. In the case of pure
production economies, one needs only to consider a positive number t. Indeed,
when Assumption S does not hold for t = 0, then the conclusion of the result
obviously holds true. To do the link precisely with Bonnisseau and Cornet
(1991, Theorem 1 p.67), the reader must consider C = X = I RN
+. It is an easy
matter to check that the proof works with a general convex cone C 7 . The
use of the cone C is technical, it is necessary to show that Assumption S holds
true, see Appendix, proof of Lemma 26 Claim 29.
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on the explicit construction of two (non con-
vex) production sets and pricing mappings. Then, one derives the existence of
our core allocation from an equilibrium, which exists thanks to Theorem 4.
Roughly speaking 8 , we prove the existence of a general equilibrium for the
production sets Y1 = VN and Y2 =  (int W)c and pricing rules relying on the
transfer rate mappings ('S)S2N and  .
In the body of the proof of Lemma 26 (Claim 3), we show that Assumption S
holds true under the requirements of Theorem 3. More precisely, from the con-
struction we made and the condition of payos-dependent balancedness (the
unique line of arguments where we need it), we derive the survival assumption
(Assumption S). Surprisingly (or not ?), the argument binds intimately the
most questionable assumptions of general equilibrium and cooperative games
theories, respectively the survivance and the balancedness.
2.3 Application 1: the case where   = 'N
Theorem 3 provides a result for non-emptiness of the core (in the standard
sense) in NTU games. Indeed, consider the statement of Theorem 3 when
  = 'N. It states that any payos-dependent balanced game has a non-empty
core.
In this section, we focus on this particular case of Theorem 3, we show how it
covers number of results involving balancedness. The proofs of the corollaries
consist only in dening the "right" mappings ('S)S2N. We also highlight, with
7 See Bonnisseau and Jamin (2003).
8 Assumptions B and BL enforce us to modify slightly the payos sets of the game
(VS;S 2 N).
7an example, that the class of payos-dependent balanced games is strictly
larger than the class of balanced games of extant literature.
Remark 5 Independently, Predtetchinski and Herings (2002) prove the fol-
lowing result: under Assumptions H1 and H2, the core of the game is non-
empty if and only if the game is payos-dependent balanced.
It follows from the previous remark that, for non-emptiness of core in NTU
games, the class of payos-dependent balanced games is maximal. Conse-
quently, obtaining as corollaries most of the results of the literature on bal-
ancedness is not surprising. Actually, this section is mainly devoted to the
manipulation of the payos-dependent balancedness condition.
2.3.1 Discussion on balancedness
There are mainly three versions of balancedness in the cooperative game the-
ory literature, Scarf (1967), Billera (1970) and Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen
(1987). The third one is the weakest. Clearly, the statement of Theorem 3
for constant mappings, ('S)S2N, encompasses itself the three versions of bal-
ancedness. Indeed, we show that the transfer rate mappings ('S)S2N at stake
can be seen as a family of b-balancedness coecients for payos taken on the
boundary of the coalitional payos. Therefore, one denes the notion (@  b)-
balancedness. Secondly, we turn to the characterization given by Keiding and
Thorlund-Petersen (1987), which is slightly claried thanks to the more read-
able notion of (@   b)-balancedness.
A family of coalition F  N is balanced if for each S 2 F, there exists
S 2 R+ such that
P
S2F S1S = 1. The game is balanced if for any balanced
family of coalition F  N, \S2FVS  VN.
The next generalized version of the balancedness use the notion of b-balanced-
ness, rstly dened in Billera (1970). For each S 2 N, let bS 2 LS+ n f0g.
A family of coalition F  N is b-balanced if for each S 2 F, there exists
S 2 I R+ such that
P
S2F SbS = bN. The game is b-balanced if for any b-
balanced family of coalition F  N, \S2FVS  VN.
Lastly, one is led to the most rened denition of (@ b)-balanced games. The
game is said to be (@   b)-balanced if for any b-balanced family of coalitions
F  N, @W
T
(\S2FVS)  VN.
Corollary 6 For each S 2 N, let bS 2 LS+ n f0g. The core of the game is
non-empty if it is (@   b)-balanced and satises Assumptions H1 and H2.
Proof of Corollary 6. We show that the game is payos-dependent bal-
anced. For each S 2 N, let bS 2 LS+nf0g. For each S 2 N, 'S is the constant
8mapping which associates 1 P
i2S bSibS to each x 2 @VS. Let x 2 @W such that
cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g \ 'N(x) 6= ;. This means that there exist S 2 I R+,










i2S bSi bS = bN, which implies that the family S(x) is b-balanced.
Then, the (@   b)-balancedness implies that x 2 VN. 
From the previous result, one can deduce Scarf (1967), Billera (1970) and
Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen (1987) results.
Assumption WH2 There exists m 2 I R such that for all x 2 VN, if x = 2
int Vfig for all i 2 N, then x  m1.
In Scarf (1967), the author proves that the core is non-empty in balanced
games under Assumptions H1 and WH2. We remark that, under Assumptions
H1 and WH2, if the game is balanced then Assumption H2 is satised. Indeed,
let S 2 N, we remark that the family fS;(fig)i= 2Sg is a balanced family. Now
let x 2 VS such that xi  vi, i 2 S. Let x0 dened by x0
i = xi, i 2 S and x0
i = vi,
i = 2 S. From Assumption H1, x0 2 VS
T
(\i= 2SVfig). From the balancedness of
the game, x0 2 VN and clearly, x0
i  vi, i 2 N. Consequently, from Assumption
WH2, x0
i  m, i 2 N, which implies xi  m, i 2 S. Thus, Scarf's result is
obtained as a corollary of Theorem 3.
In Billera (1970), the author proved that the core of the game is non-empty
in b-balanced game (he also assumes that bNi > 0 for all i 2 N) and under
Assumption H1 and H2.
The third notion is the (b;<)-balancedness, due to Keiding and Thorlund-
Petersen (1987). We let the reader check that (@   b)-balancedness is weaker
than the (b;<)-balancedness, so that the result of Keiding and Thorlund-
Petersen (1987, Theorem 2.1 p.277) is also obtained as a corollary. These
authors advance the idea that some dominated payments should not be taken
into account when examining the non-emptiness of the core, then a procedure
of elimination is proposed. This intuition will be made useless in our approach
since the irrelevant payos are straightaway disregarded by considering the ef-
cient payos on the whole game, @W. However, the notion of (b;<)-balanced
games leads Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen (1987) to a characterization for
non-emptiness of the core in the class of weakly (b;<)-balanced games. As
done before, one can clarify their result by replacing the notion of (b;<)-
balancedness by (@   b)-balancedness.
The game is weakly (@   b)-balanced if there exists a sequence fV g1
=1 of
(@ b)-balanced games such that: VN = V 
N for all , and, for all S 2 N the se-
quence fV 
Sg1
=1 converges to the set VS in the topology induced by Hausdor
metric on the set of non-empty compact sets of I RN, where VS 2 LS denotes
9the individually rational set for the coalition S, those for which x = 2 Vfig, i 2 S.
To prove the following result, it suces to duplicate the arguments of Keiding
and Thorlund-Petersen (1987, Proof of Theorem 5.1. p.286), furthermore, the
procedure they proposed is shortened in several points.
Corollary 7 Under H1,H2, the core of the game is non-empty if and only if
there exists a weakly (@   b)-balanced game (V 0;N) such that VN = V 0
N and
VS  V 0
S, S 2 N.
2.3.2 An example
We end the discussion on balancedness by considering an example. The fol-
lowing 3-player game with a non-empty core is not (@   b)-balanced. Let
N = f1;::;3g, and dene:
Vfig = fx 2 I R3 j xi  1g for all i = 1;::;3,
Vfijgi6=j = (fx 2 I R3 j xi  1g[fx 2 I R3 j xj  1g)\fx 2 I R3 j xi  2;xj  2g,
Vf123g = fx 2 I R3 j
P3
i=1 xi = 3g   I R3
+.
Then, the core is non-empty and reduced to the point (1;1;1), the game
satises Assumption H1 and H2 (take m = 2).
Proposition 8 The game is not (@   b)-balanced.
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider the two points lying outside VN: (1;2;1) 2
@W verifying
S((1;2;1)) = ff1g;f3g;f12g;f13g;f23gg;
and (1;1;2) 2 @W verifying
S((1;1;2)) = ff1g;f2g;f12g;f13g;f23gg:
Now, remark that, one of the families: C1 = ff1g;f3g;f23gg  S((1;2;1)) and
C2 = ff1g;f2g;f23gg  S((1;1;2)) must be b-balanced. Indeed, if bi
123 = 0 for
some i = 1;::;3, it is obvious, if b3
f23g = 0, then C1 is clearly b-balanced, and
similarly, if b2
f23g = 0, C2 is b-balanced. For the remaining cases, suppose that















f123g a contradiction. Consequently, one asserts
that the game cannot be (@  b)-balanced for any bS 2 LS+nf0g, S 2 N. 
The previous game provides an example of a game, which is not (@   b)-
balanced (hence, neither balanced for the previous versions), but, for which
10Theorem 3 applies. Indeed the counter-example does not hold any more with
respect to the payos-dependent balancedness condition. To prove this, let
'S, S 2 N, dened on @VS as follows: 'S(x) = ftS 2 S j tS  x = 1g. The
set-valued mappings 'S, S 2 N, have convex values, which are non-empty
since (1;1;1) 2 @VS, for all S 2 N, and from the free disposal assumption.
Furthermore, it is routine to check that these set-valued mappings are upper
semi-continuous 9 .
Suppose that x 2 @W, such that cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g\'N(pN(x)) 6= ;. Then,
there exist, for all S 2 S(x), S 2 I R+, bS 2 'S(x), and, bN 2 'N(pN(x)), such
that
P
S2S(x) S = 1 and
P
S2S(x) SbS = bN. Suppose now, that N = 2 S(x), it
implies that x = pN(x)+1 with  > 0. Therefore, for all b 2 , bx > bpN(x).
But, bN  x = (
P
S2S(x) SbS)  x =
P
S2S(x) SbS  x =
P
S2S(x) S = 1 and
bNpN(x) = 1, a contradiction. Hence, the game is payos-dependent balanced
and the existence of the point (1;1;1) lying in the core can be proved through
Theorem 3. This is not surprising, remember the result of Predtetchinski and
Herings (2002) in Remark 5.
At this point it is worth noting that the transfer rate rules ('S)S2N have been
taken as constant in the proof of Corollary 6. An actual payos-dependent
condition is given below, it cannot be handled by the previous constant ver-
sions.
2.3.3 Convex games
We now consider a case involving convexity in payos sets, and, for which
Billera (1970) gives a necessary and sucient condition for non-emptiness of
the core. He uses the notion of the support function. For all S 2 N, S denotes
the support function of VS, that is, the mapping from I RN to I R[f+1g dened
by S(p) = supfp  v j v 2 VSg.
Corollary 9 (Billera (1970)) The core of the game is non-empty if As-
sumptions H1 and H2 are satised, if VN is convex and if for all S 2 N n
N, there exists bS 2 I RN n f0g such that S(bS) is nite and for all b 2
conefbS j S 2 N n Ng, N(b)  maxf
P
S2NnN SS(bS) j 8S 2 N n N;S 
0;
P
S2NnN SbS = bg.
Remark 10 The condition is necessary if all payos sets are convex. Note
also that a TU game enters in the class of convex games  a la Billera 10 . In
9 We remark that the mappings ('S)S2N can be seen as the exact analogues of
average cost pricing rules up to a translation (we consider the point (1;1;1) instead
of (0;0;0)). An example of such rules is given in Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988,
Corollary 3.3 p.130).
10 In TU case, there exists a payment vS 2 I R for each coalition, in other terms
11this case, S(bS) is nite if and only if bS is positively proportional to 1S, which
leads back to the standard balancedness. Hyperplane games are particular cases
of convex games as well.
Proof of Corollary 9. It suces to prove that the game is payos-dependent
balanced. For each S 2 N n N, we let 'S be the constant mapping which
associates 1 P
i2N bSibS to each x 2 @VS and we let 'N(x) = NVN(x) \ , where
NVN(x) is the normal cone of convex analysis to VN at x. From the convexity
of VN and Assumption H1, the set-valued mapping 'N has convex values and
it is upper semi-continuous. From Assumption H1, bS 2 LS+, S 2 N, since
S(bS) is nite and VS is a cylinder. Let x 2 @W such that cof'S(x) j S 2
S(x)g \ 'N(pN(x)) 6= ;. Suppose that N = 2 S(x), from the denition of 'S,
this implies that there exists b 2 NVN(pN(x)) \ conefbS j S 2 S(x)g. Note
that bpN(x) = N(b). Remark also that, if x does not belong to VN, then x =
pN(x)+1 with  > 0. Consequently, bx > bpN(x) = N(b). On the other
hand, for all S 2 S(x), bS  x  S(bS). Since b 2 conefbS j S 2 S(x)g, there
exists S  0, S 2 S(x), such that b =
P
S2S(x) SbS. From our assumption,
one has N(b) 
P
S2S(x) SS(bS)  (
P
S2S(x) SbS)  x = b  x. Therefore, it
leads to a contradiction which proves that x 2 VN. 
2.4 Application 2: the case where   6= 'N
We now consider the case where the mapping   can dier from the mapping
'N, so we make full use of Theorem 3. The statement of Theorem 3 allows
us to pick up a particular element of the core for which an equilibrium holds
between the transfer rates rules.
As application, we will deduce a powerful result, Corollary 11, due to Reny
and Wooders (1996). We apply Corollary 11 to demonstrate the existence of
solutions concepts closely related to fair division schemes, namely the part-
nered core and the core intersected with the average prekernel. In Corollary
11,   will depend on the cooperative commitments of each player in all the
coalitions. The partnerships properties have been rstly described and, later,
carried out in other elds by Reny and Wooders.
2.4.1 Partnerships and average prekernel
The use of the mapping   is made more concrete in the following result,
obtained as a corollary of Theorem 3. Once again, the proof consists in taking
suitable mappings ('S)S2N and  .
VS = fx 2 I RN j
P
i2S xi  vSg.
12Corollary 11 (Reny-Wooders (1996)) Let (VS;S 2 N) be a @-balanced
game satisfying H1 and H2. Suppose that for each pair of players i and j, there
is a continuous mapping cij: @W ! I R+ such that cij is zero on V (S) \ @W
whenever i = 2 S and j 2 S. Then there exists a core allocation x such that, for
each i 2 N, i(x) :=
P
j2N(cij(x)   cji(x)) = 0.
Remark 12 The original result is stated for balanced games, it is slightly
improved by considering @-balanced games (Scarf's balancedness only on the
boundary of the feasible sets).
It makes sense to interpret the mappings cij as credit/debit mappings. Then,
one can see i(x) as the measure of the grand coalition's net indebtness to i
or as i's net credit against the grand coalition. If cij = 0 for each i;j 2 N
then one gets Scarf's result. For this rened balanced game result, we provide
a direct and intuitive proof. The set-valued mapping   will take into account
individual contributions in the payos of the grand coalition, then  i stands
for the cooperation index of the agent i. One is led to show the existence of a
constant index among the agents.
Proof of Corollary 11. Firstly, notice that, for each x 2 @W, (x) 2 1?.
Then, put for each x 2 @W: (x) = maxi2N j i(x) j and let ~ i, i 2 N, be
mappings from @W to R+: ~ i(x) := 1
(x)+1
i(x)
jNj . The idea of the proof is to
include in a suitable way the net credit and normalized mapping ~  into  .
Dene for each x 2 @VS, S 2 N, and each x0 2 @VN :
'S(x) = m
S and  (x
0) = m
N   ~ (pW(x
0))
It appears clearly that, for each S 2 N, 'S is valued into S, and,   is
valued into . Furthermore, the mappings are all upper semi-continuous with
non-empty compact and convex values. It stems from the continuity of the
mappings cij and the normalization we choose.
Lemma 13 If there exists x 2 @W such that cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g \
 (pN(x)) 6= ;, then  (pN(x)) = mN.
We provide in Appendix the detailed proof of Lemma 13. Let x 2 @W, then
from Lemma 13 the condition cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g\ (pN(x)) 6= ; says that
the family S(x) is balanced and since the game is @-balanced one deduces
that the game is payos-dependent balanced. Now, applying Theorem 3, there
exists x in the core of the game and such that cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g \
 (pN(x)) 6= ;. Noticing that x = pN(x) = pW(x) and using once again Lemma
13, this implies that ~ (x) = 0, that is (x) = 0, so Corollary 11 is proved. 
We brie
y recall two applications of the last result, namely the partnered
core and the average prekernel intersected with the core, we refer the reader
13respectively to the works of Reny and Wooders (1996) and Orshan et al.
(2001).
A payo x 2 @W is said to be partnered if the collection S(x) satises, for
all i;j 2 N, Pi  Pj ) Pj  Pi where Pi = fS 2 S(x) j i 2 Sg. Then,
the concept of partnered core stands for the set of feasible payos, which
cannot be improved upon by any coalition with an additional requirement of
no asymmetric dependencies. Reny and Wooders (1996) apply Corollary 11 to
suitable mappings cij such that x is in the partnered core (the core intersected
with the set of partnered outcomes). Indeed, Bennett and Zame (1988) have
exhibited suitable mappings, satisfying the requirements of Corollary 11, which
are: cij(x) = minfdist (xS;V (S)) j S 2 N and i = 2 S 3 jg for each x 2 @W
where dist is the Euclidean distance 11 .
As a second direct application, one can also prove the existence of an ele-
ment lying in the core intersected with the average prekernel (former bilateral
consistent prekernel) as dened in Orshan and Zarzuelo (2000), see also Ser-
rano and Shimomura (2001). The average prekernel is the consistent exten-
sion of the usual prekernel at stake in TU games. The result can be deduced
from Corollary 11 by considering suitable credit mappings. Indeed, the av-
erage prekernel may be rewritten as the set of elements x 2 @VN such that
P
j2N(cij(x) cji(x)) = 0 for some credit mappings satisfying the requirements
of Corollary 11 (in this context, cij(x) can be seen as the weighted surplus of
agent i with respect to agent j at the point x). Orshan et al. (2001) have
shown the non-emptiness of the core intersected with the average prekernel in
@-separating games, here the result is improved by considering the larger class
of @-balanced games 12 .
3 Parameterized collection of NTU games
This section intends to unify the literature, which uses explicitly or implic-
itly parameterized collection of games. To take into account the environment
and the possible interactions between players payments, we introduce here a
11 If the core of the game is not tight, the partnership property holds automatically.
Indeed if we take an element in the core such that x = 2 VS for each S 2 N n N,
which exists if the core is not tight, then Pi[x] = Pj[x] = fNg for each i;j 2 N,
where Pi[x] denotes the partners of agent i in x, hence the core is partnered. The
statement of Theorem 3 is in the same spirit since in the case of non tight core
one can get: cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g = 'N(x) and thus 'N(x) \  (x) 6= ; that is:
mN = 'N(x) =  (x) = mN   ~ (x), then (x) = 0.
12 Note that a @-separating game is @-balanced. To dene the average prekernel, we
need to introduce two more assumptions on the game, namely non-levelness and
smoothness.
14canonical version of parameterized collection of games and equilibrium-core
allocation. The stake is the following: the players receive payos in function
of an element  2  which stands for a given abstract environment. For any
given  2  and a payo (x1;:::;xn) 2 I RN, a set-valued mapping G restricts
the set of possible parameters to G(;x). The mapping G will guarantee the
equilibrium. Then, we dene an equilibrium-core allocation, which is a pair
of an environment and a payo, the payo belonging to the core of the game
associated to the environment, and, the environment being a xed point of
the equilibrium set-valued mapping.
The model is closely linked up to the model of Ichiishi (1981), who denes a
Social Coalitional Equilibrium. We show that it is a corollary of our main re-
sult. Another example of application is provided by Border (1984) for the core
of an economy without ordered preferences. Note that these results originally
used the same mathematical tool in their proofs. These authors have applied
Fan's coincidence theorem to exhibit the non-emptiness of the core at stake.
Furthermore the general framework could allow us to investigate some other
topics of economic theory (see Section 4 for a discussion). For instance, Ichiishi
and Idzik (1996) have shown the non-emptiness of the incentive compatible
core in incomplete information framework, using Ichiishi's Social Coalitional
Equilibrium existence.
Obviously the parametric framework encompasses the case of constant payos
sets with respect to the environment, then the results of Section 2 are all
covered by Theorem 18 presented below.
3.1 Equilibrium-core allocations
We need some new notations since the payos are taken as set-valued map-
pings. We consider a parameterized collection of cooperative games which is
dened as follows: for each parameter  2 , each coalition has a feasible
set of payos VS(), which is a subset of I RN. Moreover, there exists a global
feasible set of payos V (). Here the denition of the game is slightly modied
since we consider an additional set V (), which possibly diers from VN().
This distinction is made to take into account works where V will point out the
feasible set of the whole economy as in Border (1984). The distinction is also
made more concrete in Ichiishi (1981) where V denotes the set of all feasible
allocations in coalition structure, see also the justication given in the seminal
paper of Boehm (1974), where V can dier from VN due to costs of forming a
coalition 13 .
13 As quoted in Section 2.4, one naturally associates the transfer rate rule   to the
set V .
15Equilibrium will be given by a set-valued mapping G from   I RN to .
We again denote by W() = [S2NVS() the union of the payos sets. For any
given parameter  2 , the NTU game is denoted (V ();VS()S2N). Let S(y)
be the set fS 2 N j y 2 @VS()g. Formally, the parameterized collection of
cooperative games is summarized by:
For all S 2 N; VS :  ! I R
N; V :  ! I R
N and G :   I R
N ! :
Denition 14 An equilibrium-core allocation is a vector (;x) 2   I RN
such that:
x
 2 @V (





The assumptions on the game are the following. They stand for the former
H1, H2. Actually we just add continuous dependencies with respect to the
environment.
Assumption PH0  is a non-empty, convex, compact subset of an Eu-
clidean space. G is a non-empty upper semi-continuous set-valued mapping
with convex values.
Assumption PH1 (i) The set-valued mappings Vfig, i 2 N, and V are non-
empty valued. VS, S 2 N, and V are lower semi-continuous set-valued
mappings with closed graph.
(ii) For each  2 , VS(), S 2 N, and V () satisfy Assumption H1(ii).
Assumption PH2 For all  2  there exists m() 2 I R such that, for all
S 2 N, x 2 VS(), if x = 2 int Vfig(), for all i 2 S, then xi  m(). For
all  2 , for all x 2 V () such that xi = 2 int Vfig, for all i 2 N, then
x  m()1.
Remark 15 Assumption H1 implies that there exist functions vi, i 2 N, from
 to I R, such that, for each  2 , Vfig() = fz 2 RN j zi  vi()g. Bonnis-
seau (1997, Lemma 3.1. p.217) states that if a set-valued mapping M from 
to I RN is lower semi-continuous with non-empty values, has a closed graph and
satises Assumption H1(ii) for all  2 , then there exists a continuous map-
ping  from 1? to I R such that, for all (;s) 2 1?, s (;s)1 2 @M().
For V , let pV and V be the continuous mappings dened respectively on
I RN and 1? such that: pV(;x) = proj(x) V(;proj(x))1 2 @VN().
We dene similarly the mappings pW and W associated to W.
Denition 16 A parameterized collection of games ((V ();VS()S2N); 2 )
is payos-dependent balanced if the following assertion is satised:
There exist set-valued mappings 'S from Gr @VS to S, S 2 N, which are
upper semi-continuous with non-empty compact and convex values, and a set-
valued mapping   from Gr @V to , which is upper semi-continuous with
non-empty compact and convex values, such that:
16For each (;x) 2 Gr @W, if cof'S(;x) j S 2 S(x)g \  (;pV(;x)) 6= ;,
then x 2 V ().
Remark 17 To do the link with the literature, the notion of payos-dependent
balancedness is a generalization of the balancedness in the sense of Boehm
(1974), which says that (in our parameterized framework), for a given  2 ,
the game (V ();VS()S2N) is balanced if for all balanced family F, \S2FVS() 
V (). We add payos-dependent balancedness to this denition.
The third result of the paper is the following.
Theorem 18 Under Assumptions PH0, PH1 and H2, in any payos-dependent
balanced parameterized collection of games, there exists an equilibrium-core al-











The proof, referred to Appendix, follows the geometric construction given in
the proof of Theorem 3.
3.2 Two applications of parameterized collection of cooperative games
In this section, the dierent works we review use an alternative version of
Boehm's condition (see Remark 17), where the balancedness relies on feasi-
ble allocations of the economy and no more on the outcomes of the game.
In any case, we recover a balancedness on the game and the constructions
of the balancing mappings 'S and   are unchanged (see Section 2.3.1). In
the following, note that we do not need any payos-dependencies in the bal-
ancedness condition. Roughly speaking, for any given parameter, the games,
(V ();(VS())S2N), are balanced with constant transfer rules, so one mostly
focuses on the role of the parameterization in these models. The two applica-
tions, we proposed here, will clarify the usefulness of the mapping G, which
is explicitly given in each case. Elementary proofs are provided thanks to
Theorem 18.
3.2.1 Ichiishi's Social Coalitional Equilibrium
The Social Coalitional Equilibrium of Ichiishi (1981) is the benchmark work in
the framework of parameterized collection of games. Furthermore, the general
formulation of the Equilibrium, where the agents can realize a coalition struc-
ture, encompasses Debreu (1952)'s Social Equilibrium and the usual core as
special cases. Some applications of this seminal result are reviewed in Ichiishi
(1993).
17A coalition structure is a partition of N. Let P be a non-empty collection of
coalition structure, a member of P is denoted P. Players will play cooperative
games parameterized by the elements of a set . The model is the following:
each player has a parameter set i (S =
Q
i2S i,  = N). For each S 2 N,
let F S be a mapping from  into S. Preference relation of each player i in a
coalition S is represented by a utility function; vi
S : Gr F S ! I R.
A Social Coalitional Equilibrium of a society is a pair of a parameter  2 
and admissible coalition structure P  2 P, such that: (i) For each D 2 P ,
D 2 F D(). (ii) It is not true that there exists S 2 N and 0 2 F S()
such that vi
S(;0) > vi
D(i)(;D(i)) for every i 2 S, where D(i) 2 P  and
i 2 D(i).
Corollary 19 (Ichiishi(1981)) There exists a Social Coalitional Equilibrium
if: (1) For every i 2 N, i is a non-empty, convex compact subset of an Eu-
clidean space. (2) For every S 2 N, F S is a lower and upper semi-continuous
set-valued mapping with non-empty values. (3) For every S 2 N, vi
S is con-
tinuous on Gr F S. (4) For every  2  and every v 2 I R, if there exists a
balanced collection B such that for each S 2 B there exists (S) 2 F S() for
which vi  ui
S(;(S)) for each i 2 S, then there exist P 2 P and 0D 2 F D()
for every D 2 P such that vi  ui
D(;0D) for all i 2 D 2 P. (5) For every
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In the original paper of Ichiishi, the strategy sets are taken as Hausdor topo-
logical vector spaces, we limit here the corollary within the Euclidean spaces.
Proof of Corollary 19. For each S 2 N, let us dene:
VS() =
n
u 2 I R
N j 9
0 2 F
S(); ui  v
i
S(;
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Consider the parameterized collection of games dened above, we show that it
meets the requirements of Theorem 18. We begin with the condition of payos-
dependent balancedness. For each S 2 N, let 'S be the constant mapping
18equals to mS and   = 'N. Let (;x) be in Gr @W such that cof'S(;x) j
S 2 S(x)g \  (;pV(;x)) 6= ;. As seen before, one easily checks that the
family S(x) is balanced. For each S 2 S(x), there exists (S) 2 F S()
for which xi  ui
S(;(S)), i 2 S. Then, from (4), there exist P 2 P and
0D 2 F D() for every D 2 P such that xi  ui
D(;0D), i 2 D 2 P. It states
that x 2
P
D2P ~ VD() 2 V ().
Ichiishi proved the continuity of the set-valued mappings VS and V (Ichiishi,
1981, Proof of Lemma, step 1, p.372) so PH1 clearly holds true. G is non-empty
from the denitions of pV and V , and, convex valued from (5). It suces to
prove that G has a closed graph to imply that it is upper semi-continuous. It
is straightforward, from the niteness of P and (2), (3), so PH0 holds. (1) and
the continuity of vi
S guarantees that PH2 is satised.
We apply Theorem 18, then there exists (;x) such that  2 G(;x)
and x 2 @V () n int W(). Hence, there exists P 2 P such that for all
D 2 P, D 2 F D() and pV(;x)  (vi
D(i)(;D(i)))i2N, furthermore
x = pV(;x). Necessarily (vi
D(i)(;D(i)))i2N 2 @V () n int [S2N VS(),
satisfying the requirement of Social Coalitional Equilibrium. 
Ichiishi and Quinzii (1983) use a variant of Corollary 19 to prove the non-
emptiness for economies with increasing returns. The authors split the parame-
ter set into an abstract parameter set and action sets for each individual. More-
over, they do not need the agents realize a coalition structure, they only use the
benchmark partition N. Therefore, V = VN, and, the feasibility condition in
the denition of Social Equilibrium must hold only on the coarsest coalition N.
Using our own materials, one can prove directly the result as stated in Ichiishi
and Quinzii (1983, Lemma A p.406). Furthermore, since we make no distinc-
tion between V and VN, the conclusion of Theorem 18 gives a core allocation
equilibrium (;x) such that cof'S(;x) j S 2 S(x)g\ (;x) 6= ; (in-
deed pW(x) = x). And, it is true for any mappings ('S)S2N and   satisfying
the standard balancedness condition, especially for the ones dened in Section
2.4.1.
Consequently, one could have combined results from Section 2.4 with the so-
lution concept of Social Equilibrium to show, for instance, the existence of
a Social Equilibrium with partnerships. Indeed, by considering the condition
resting on the mappings ('S)S2N and   and under Assumptions given in Ichi-
ishi and Quinzii (1983, Lemma A p.406), one could prove that there exists
a Social Equilibrium such that the social outcome is a partnered outcome,
from Corollary 11. Though the concept of partnered structure is much weaker
than any partition structure, it avoids the use of the ad hoc Assumption (4)
in Corollary 19. Then, the emerging structure is obtained as the outcome of
an endogenous process. To the best of our knowledge, such solutions have not
been explored any further in this parameterized framework.
19Remark 20 In a standard cooperative game, one can also dene solution con-
cepts dealing with coalition structure. Using Theorem 18 when the parameter
set is reduced to a point, one provides a sucient condition for non-emptiness
of the core with a coalition structure, in NTU games, if V is the super-additive
cover of the game (VS;S 2 N) dened by [P2P
P
S2Pfx 2 VS j xi = 0; i 2
N n Sg.
3.2.2 Core allocations for non-ordered preferences
One can also recover Border (1984)'s result from our abstract result following
the reasonings of the previous section, and, the generalization given by Kajii
(1992) which is also brie
y described. Border proves the non-emptiness of
the core of an economy where the agents preferences are non ordered. One
exhibits a parameterized collection of games such that the core of the economy
is exactly the equilibrium allocation stated in Denition 14.
Let i, i 2 N, be the payos set of agent i, S =
Q
i2S i and  = N. For
each S 2 N, let F S be the feasibility mapping from  into S and denote
by  2  the set of all jointly feasible allocations. Preference relation of each
player is represented by a set-valued mapping Pi from i into i.
An element  2  is said to be in the core if : (i)  2 . (ii) There is no S 2 N
and 0 2 F S() satisfying 0
i 2 Pi(i) for all i 2 S.
Corollary 21 (Border (1984)) The core is non-empty if: (1) For each i,
i is a non-empty convex subset of a Euclidean space. (2) For each S 2 N,
F S :  ! S is a lower and upper semi-continuous set-valued mapping with
compact values and F i, i 2 N, is non-empty valued. (3)  is compact and
convex. (4) For each i, Pi has an open graph in i  i and i = 2 coPi(i).
(5) The game is balanced: for all 0 2 , for any balanced family  with the
balancing weights , if there exist (B)B2 such that B 2 F B(0), B 2 ,




Remark 22 As Scarf (1967), Border only assumes compacity on the set of all
jointly feasible allocations. The reasonings of Section 2.3.1 to get WH2 from
H2 will overcome this diculty.
Proof of Corollary 21. Without a loss of generality, we can assume that
Pi(i) is convex. Using a well known trick, dene pseudo-utility functions vi :
ii ! I R, i 2 N, as follows: vi(0
i;i) = dist[(i;0
i);(Gr Pi)c]. The convexity
of Pi(i) implies that vi is quasi-concave in its rst argument (see Border's
Appendix).
A parameterized collection of games is dened on the compact set . For each
 2 , for each S 2 N, let VS() = fu 2 I RN j 90 2 F S(); ui  vi(0
i;i); i 2
20Sg, and, V () = fu 2 I RN j 90 2 ; ui  vi(0
i;i); i 2 Ng.
Remark also that  2  is in the core if and only if 0 2 V ()nint [S2N VS().
Put:
G(;x) = f
0 2  j pV(;x)  (vi(
0
i;i))i2Ng:
Consider the game above. We provide in Appendix the detailed and rather
technical proof that the assumptions of Theorem 18 are all fullled. Then,
there exists a bundle (;x) such that x 2 @V () n int W() and  2
G(;x). Hence, x = pV(;x)  (vi(
i;
i))i = 0 2 @V () and  2 .
That is to say that 0 2 @V () n int W() and  2 , as required. 
This model has been carried out more generally. Kajii (1992), proposes a gen-
eralization of both Border's result and of Scarf's -core non-emptiness result
(Scarf, 1971). The same construction as in the previous proof can be applied
to show Kajii's result. The dierence comes from the fact that preferences
are interdependent, that is, the mappings P i are dened from  into . Con-
sequently the pseudo utility mappings are dened on    but still verify
quasi-concavity in their rst variables (Kajii, 1992, p.196).
In this setting, a coalition S blocks a feasible allocation  2  if there exists
0 2 F S() such that for all 00 with 00
i = 0
i all i 2 S, one has 00 2 Pi().
Then, the payos sets are naturally dened as: VS() = fu 2 I RN j 90 2
F S() such that for all 00
i = 0
i;i 2 S; ui  vi(00;); i 2 Sg, for all S 2 N and
V () = fu 2 I RN j 90 2  ui  vi(0;); i 2 Ng, these mappings satisfy the
expected properties of continuities as in Border's setting. We obtain the result
of Kajii (1992, Corollary p.201) (he additionally assumes that F N() =  and












The mapping G is an upper semi-continuous set-valued mapping with convex
values as a nite intersection of upper semi-continuous set-valued mappings
with convex values. G has non-empty values since, for all (;x) 2   I RN,
pV(;x) 2 V () by denition. Therefore the parameterized collection of games
meets the requirements of Theorem 18.
4 Further developments
We discuss the literature which could be submitted to a similar treatment. In
non-convex economies, the most achieved results for non-emptiness of cores
are deeply relying on elasticities conditions of the demand functions (Ichiishi
21and Quinzii, 1983) which raise some basic diculties in terms of interpre-
tation. These works consist mostly in recovering some convexity properties,
as far as possible, to draw nearer to the notion of distributive sets intro-
duced by Scarf (1986), then, they comprehend the non convexity thanks to
convexifying assumptions. New developments could follow from Theorem 18
within a non-convex environment, indeed the payos-dependent balancedness
enlarges the geometric possibilities to get a non-empty core. The negative
result (Scarf, 1986, Theorem 5 p.426) delimits, however, the range of new re-
sults. Direct approaches for the core are inspired by Florenzano (1989), one
should restate payos-dependent balancedness into her framework where no
cooperative game structure is dened. Here, the balancing weights should rest
on the fundamentals of the economy.
In addition, one can cite related topics partially evoked in this paper. For
the games in parametric form: the incentive cores in asymmetric information,
see Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) and Ichiishi and Radner (1999), both using the
seminal result of Ichiishi (1981); the -core, as seen before with Scarf (1971)
and Kajii (1992), see also Yannelis (1991) where feasibility constraints are
incorporated. We have shown that such recent works can receive a positive
treatment by computations of equilibrium-core allocations. Note however that,
in both research elds, there exist robust counterexamples of empty cores (see
respectively Forges et al. (2002) and Holly (1994)).
Core allocations with additional requirements are, in particular, linked up to
the fair division schemes. Indeed, as quoted by Reny and Wooders (1996),
the notion of partnered collections of sets is closely related to the concept
of kernel (prekernel) at stake in NTU games. We have clearly illustrate this
point in Section 2.4.1 showing the connection between the partnered core and
core intersected with average prekernel. Besides, the notion of partnership
gave also rise to a literature on the side of covering theorems as developed by
Reny and Wooders (1998), see also Ichiishi and Idzik (2002). Lastly, Page and
Wooders (1996) extended the notion of partnership to competitive equilibrium
and cores in economies. Very recently, Herings et al. (2003) dene a notion of
Social Stable core allocations, for which power indexes are equally shared out
among the coalitions, Social Stable core allocations are also very much in the
spirit of core solution with equilibrium for credit/debit mappings.
225 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Let Y2 =  (int W)c where (int W)c denotes the complementary of the interior of
the set W. Note that Y2 is bounded above by  v. Let ~ '2 be the set-valued mapping
from @Y2 to  dened by
~ '2(y2) = co f'S( y2) j S 2 S( y2)g:
Lemma 23 For all (y2;p) 2 Gr ~ '2 and such that y2i <  m for some i 2 N, then
pi = 0.
Proof of Lemma 23. Let y2 2 @Y2 such that y2 = 2 f m1g+I RN
+. Let i 2 N such
that y2i <  m. Then, for all S 2 S( y2) we show that i = 2 S. Indeed, recalling that
 y2  v, Assumption H2 states that if  y2 2 VS, then  y2j  m for all j 2 S.
Thus, i = 2 S. Consequently, for all S 2 S( y2), for all p 2 'S( y2), pi = 0 since 'S
takes its values in S. Hence, for all p 2 ~ '2(y2), pi = 0. 
Since Y2 is bounded above by  v and from Assumption H2, the set Y2 \(f m1g+
I RN
+) is compact, therefore there exists  > 0 such that proj(y) 2 B1?(0;) for all
y 2 Y2 \ (f m1g + I RN
+), where m is the upper bound chosen in H2.
Dene Y1 = fpN(s) j s 2  B1?(0;)g   I RN
+, we remark that, for all y1 2 @Y1, if
proj(y1) 2  B1?(0;) then y1 2 @VN. Put y 2 int Y1.
Lemma 24 There exists a continuous mapping c from @Y1 to ++ such that c(y1)
(y1   y)  0 for all y1 2 @Y1.
Proof of Lemma 24. Since Y1 satises the free disposal condition and y 2 int Y1,
for all y1 2 @Y1, there exists a vector p 2 ++ such that p  (y1   y) > 0. Dene
the set valued mapping   from @Y1 to ++ as  (y1) =

p 2 ++ j p  (y1   y) > 0
	
,
this set-valued mapping is non-empty valued from the argument above. It is an easy
matter to check that it has open graph and convex values. One gets the existence of
a continuous selection of   applying a weak version of Michael's selection theorem.

Let ~ '1 be the set-valued mapping from @Y1 to  dened by:
~ '1(y1) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
 (y1) if kproj(y1)k < 
cof (y1);c(y1)g if kproj(y1)k = 
c(y1) if kproj(y1)k > 
Lemma 25 For all (y1;y2) 2 @Y1  @Y2 and p 2  such that proj(y1) =  proj(y2)
and p 2 ~ '1(y1) \ ~ '2(y2), one has p 2  (y1) and y1 2 @VN.
23Proof of Lemma 25. We rst prove that kproj(y1)k  . Indeed, if it is not
true, then '1(y1) = c(y1) 2 ++ and, from Lemma 23 and the choice of , since
kproj(y2)k = kproj(y1)k > , one has '2(y2) = 2 ++. But, this contradicts p 2
~ '1(y1) \ ~ '2(y2). Now, the above remark implies that y1 2 @VN. If p = 2  (y1),
kproj(y1)k =  and p 2 ++. The same argument leads again to a contradiction.

Given these materials, one can state the following technical lemma. The proof con-
sists of the verications of Theorem 4 assumptions with respect to the construction
above.
Lemma 26 Y1,Y2 and ~ '1, ~ '2 satisfy the requirements of Theorem 4.
Proof of Lemma 26. We check with the three following claims that the assump-
tions of Theorem 4 hold true for the sets Y1 and Y2 and the mappings ~ '1 and
~ '2.
Claim 27 Y1 and ~ '1 satises Assumptions P, PR and BL.
Proof of Claim 27. Y1 clearly satises Assumption P, Assumption PR is also
clearly satised from the denition of the set-valued mapping ~ '1 and the continuity
of the function c.
Assumption BL also holds true. Indeed, there exists  2 I R such that for all s 2
 B(0;) and for all p 2 , p  (s   N(s)1)   and p  y  . Thus one gets that
p  y1   for all (y1;p) 2 Gr ~ '1, using Lemma 24. 
Claim 28 Y2 and ~ '2 satises Assumptions P, PR and BL.
Proof of Claim 28. One easily checks that Y2 is closed and that it satises
the free-disposal assumption so P is satised. ~ '2 has obviously convex compact
values from the assumption of payos-dependent balancedness. ~ '2 has non-empty
values since y2 2 @Y2 implies that  y2 2 @VS for at least one S 2 N. Since  is
compact, it suces to show that the set-valued mapping ~  2 dened by ~  2(y2) =
[S2S( y2)'S( y2) has a closed graph in order to prove that ~ '2 is upper semi-
continuous. Let (y
2;p) a sequence of @Y2   which converges to (y2;p) and such
that p 2 ~  2(y
2) for all . From the denition of S, for  large enough, S( y
2) 
S( y2). Consequently, for all  large enough, there exists S 2 S( y2) such that
p 2 'S( y). Since S( y2) is a nite set, there exists a subsequence such that
S is constant equal to S. Since 'S is upper semi-continuous, this implies that
p 2 'S( y2)  ~  2(y2). It ends the proof.
Assumption BL also holds true. Indeed, for all (y2;p) 2 Gr ~ '2, from Lemma 23, one
has p  y2 
P
i2N;y2i m piy2i   m
P
i2N;y2i m pi =  m
P
i2N pi =  m. 
Claim 29 Assumptions B and S are satised.
Proof of Claim 29. Assumption B is satised since Y2 is bounded above by  v
and Y1 is also bounded above since fpN(s) j s 2  B1?(0;)g is a compact set.
24Assumption S holds true. If it is not the case, there exists t > 0, (y1;y2) 2 @Y1@Y2
and p 2 ~ '1(y1)\ ~ '2(y2) such that y1 +y2 +t1 2 C and p(y1 +y2 +t1) = 0. Since
p 2 I RN
+ n f0g and C  I RN
++ [ f0g, one deduces that y1 + y2 + t1 = 0 . Let
s1 = proj(y1) and s2 = proj(y2). Clearly, s1 =  s2. Then one can apply Lemma 25
which states that y1 2 @VN and p 2  (y1).
Let x =  y2, thus x 2 @W. s1 =  s2 implies that pN(x) = y1 consequently
cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g \  (pN(x)) 6= ;. Thus, since the game is payos-dependent
balanced, one has x 2 VN. But y1 = x t1 contradicts the fact that y1 2 @VN from
the free disposal property of VN. 
From the previous claims, the conclusion of Lemma 26 is satised. 
Theorem 4 implies that there exists a vector (y1;y2;p) 2 @Y1  @Y2   such that:
y1 + y2 2 C  f0g [ I RN
++, and, p 2 ~ '1(y1) \ ~ '2(y2).
We rst show that y1 + y2 = 0. If it is not true,  y2  y1. But y1 2 Y1  VN,
and, thus,  y2 2 int VN  int W, which contradicts that  y2 2 (int W)c. Since
proj(y1) =  proj(y2), applying Lemma 25, we get p 2 cof'S(y1) j S 2 S(y1)g \
 (y1) 6= ; and y1 2 @VN. Since y1 =  y2 2 @W, y1 = 2 int VS for all S 2 N. As was
to be proved, y1 satises the conclusion of Theorem 3. 
5.2 Proof of Lemma 13.
Suppose for some x 2 @W that cof'S(x) j S 2 S(x)g \  (pN(x)) 6= ;. Then
there exists some non-negative S for each S 2 S(x) such that:
P
S2S(x) S = 1,
x = pW(pN(x)) and mN  
P
S2S(x) SmS = ~ (pW(pN(x))) (). To end the proof,
we show that :  := ~ (x) = 0. Putting M := fm 2 N j 
m = maxi2N 
i g, we only
need to show that
P
i2M 
i  0 since  = ~ (x) 2 1?. If i 2 M and j 2 N n M,
that is 
j < 
i , then, from (), there exists R 2 S(x) such that R 3 j and i = 2 R.
Therefore, cij(x) = 0 from the denition of the mapping cij. Using this argument
in the following lines extracted from Ichiishi and Idzik (2002) 14 , we get, denoting
























Consequently  = 0. 
14 They provide a new proof of an extension of the KKMS theorem proposed by Reny and Wooders (1998),
which was also exhibiting the partnership property.
255.3 Proof of Theorem 18
We rst introduce some uniform bounds with respect to the parameter set. From
the lower semi-continuity and closed graph assumptions of the set valued Vfig, it
is immediate to see that the mappings vi, i 2 N, are continuous. Let us denote
v = minfvi() j  2 ; i 2 Ng1. The bound m() given in Assumption PH2 can
also be chosen continuous since the set-valued mapping VS, S 2 N, are lower semi-
continuous with closed graph. Let m = maxfm() j  2 g. These elements exist
since  is compact.
We dene the set-valued mapping Y2 from  into I RN by:
Y2() =  int (W()c):
Note that Y2 is lower semi-continuous with a closed graph, and, for all  2 ,
Y2()   I RN
+ = Y2() and Y1() 6= I RN. Let ~ '2 be the set-valued mapping from
Gr @Y2 into  dened by:
~ '2(;y2) = co f'S(; y2) j S 2 S( y2)g:
Lemma 30 Let (;y2) 2 Gr @Y2, if y2i <  m for some i 2 N, then pi = 0 for all
p 2 ~ '2(;y2).
Proof of Lemma 30. We apply Lemma 23 to the set-valued mappings ~ '2(;:)
and the set Y2(). 
Since Y2() is uniformly bounded above by  v, there exists  such that proj(;y2) 2
 B1?(0;) for all (;y2) 2 Gr @Y2 such that y2 2 (f meg + I RN
+). Let us dene the
set-valued mapping Y1 from  into I RN by:
Y1() =





Since pV is continuous, note that Y1 is lower semi-continuous with a closed graph,
and, for all  2 , Y1()   I RN
+ = Y1() and Y1() 6= I RN. Then, the compacity of
 implies the existence of two real numbers 1 and 1 such that for all y1 2 fz1 2
@Y1() j kproj(z1)k  ;  2 g, 11  y1  11. Note also that, for all  2 , for
all y1 2 @Y1(), if kproj(y1)k  , then y1 2 @V (). Let us choose y0 2 int Y1() for
all  2 . Such element exists since every element strictly inferior to 11 satises
this condition.
Lemma 31 There exists a continuous mapping c from Gr @Y1 to ++ such that
c(;y1)  (y1   y0)  0 for all (;y1) 2 Gr @Y1.
Proof of Lemma 31. Dene a mapping  0 on Gr @Y1 such that  0(;y1) = fp 2
++ j p(y1  y0) > 0g and use the arguments given in the proof of Lemma 24. 
26Let ~ '1 be the set-valued mapping from Gr @Y1 into  dened by:
~ '1(;y1) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
 (;y1) if kproj(y1)k < 
cof (;y1);c(;y1)g if kproj(y1)k = 
c(;y1) if kproj(y1)k > 
Lemma 32 There exists  2 I R such that, for all (;y1;y2) 2 Gr (@Y1  @Y2),
(p1;p2) 2 ~ '(;y1)  ~ '2(;y2) , one has p1  y1 + p2  y2  .
Proof of Lemma 32. For all (;y2) 2 Gr @Y2, for all p 2 ~ '2(;y2), from Lemma
30, one has p  y2 
P
i2N;y2i m piy2i   m
P
i2N;y2i m pi =  m
P
i2N pi =  m
since p 2 . Secondly, for all (;y1) 2 Gr @Y1, p 2 ~ '1(;y1), if kproj(y1)k   then
p  y1  p  11 = 1; if kproj(y1)k > , from Lemma 31, p  y1 = c(;y1)  y1 
c(;y1)  y0  minfq  y0 j q 2 g. Hence p  y1 is bounded below, which proves the
result. 
Since the values of Y1 and Y2 are respectively uniformly bounded above by 11 and
 v, there exists a convex and compact set  B 2 (1?)2 such that: B(0;)B(0;)   B
and for all (;y1;y2) 2 Gr (@Y1  @Y2) such that y1 + y2   1 2 I RN
++ [ f0g,
(proj(y1);proj(y2)) 2 int  B.
Finally, using again (Bonnisseau, 1997, Lemma 3.1 p.217), one introduces the con-
tinuous mappings 1 and 2 from   1? to I R associated to Y1 and Y2. We x
 > 0 arbitrary, let  be the set

p 2 I RN j
P
i2N pi = 1; pi   ; i 2 N
	
.




F2(;(s1;s2);p;(p1;p2)) = f 2 B j
P2
i=1(p   pi)  i 
P2
i=1(p   pi)  0
i; 80 2 Bg
F3(;(s1;s2);p;(p1;p2)) = fq 2  j (q   q0)  (y1 + y2)  0; 8q0 2 g
F4(;(s1;s2);p;(p1;p2)) = (~ '1(;y1); ~ '2(;y2))
where for i = 1;2, yi = si   i(;si)1.
Lemma 33 The mapping F satises Kakutani's xed point theorem conditions.
Proof of Lemma 33. F is a set valued mapping from a non-empty, convex,
compact set into itself. Actually, it suces to verify for F4 that the assumptions
of Kakutani's xed point theorem are satised since the others components meet
obviously the expected conditions.
By construction, ~ '1 is a non-empty, convex valued and upper semi-continuous. ~ '2 is
obviously convex valued and it has non-empty values since (;y2) 2 Gr @Y2 implies
that  y2 2 @VS() for at least one S 2 N. Since  is compact, it suces to show
that the set-valued mapping ~  2 dened by ~  2(;y2) = [S2S( y2)'S(; y2) has a
27closed graph in order to prove that ~ '2 is upper semi-continuous. Let (;y;p) a
sequence of Gr @Y2   which converges to (;y;p) and such that p 2 ~  2(;y)
for all . From the denition of S, for  large enough, S( y
2)  S( y2). Indeed,
it is not true, since N is a nite set, there exists S 2 N and a subsequence (;y)
such that for  large enough  y
2 2 @VS(),  y2 = 2 @VS(). Since VS is a lower
semi-continuous set-valued mapping with a closed graph and VS()   I RN
+ = VS(),
the set-valued mapping  ! @VS() has a closed graph. Since  (y
2) converges to
 y2, one gets a contradiction. Consequently, for all  large enough, there exists
S 2 S( y2) such that p 2 'S(; y
2). Since S( y2) is a nite set, there
exists a subsequence such that S is constant equal to S. Since 'S is upper semi-
continuous, this implies that p 2 'S(; y2), which is included in ~  2(;y2) since
S 2 S( y2). 




2)) such that, if, for






















i for each 0 2 B (3)
(p   q0)  (y
1 + y
2)  0 for each q0 2  (4)
(p
1;p
2) 2 (~ '1(;y
1); ~ '2(;y
2)) (5)
We now exhibit from the above equations an element satisfying the conclusion of
Theorem 18 15 . Let 
 =  p  (y
1 + y
2), remark that p  (y
1 + y
2 + 
e) = 0 and

   . Indeed, p 
P2
i=1 y

















i   from Lemma 32.













1 2 f0g[I RN
++ and it follows that (s
j) 2 int  B by construction
of the set  B. Then p = p
1 = p
2 2 , from (3), since the maximum of a linear









It remains to show that y
1 2 @VN() and p 2  (;y
1). The argument is exactly
the same as the one in the proof of Lemma 25.
Let  =  y
2 and x = y
1. It implies that  2 @W() and therefore, from x  
+
1 = 0, it follows that pW(;x) = , or, equivalently, pV (;) = x. From
(5), p 2  (;pV (;)) \ cof'S(;) j S 2 S()g. So we deduce from the
condition of payos-dependent balancedness that  2 V (). Since  2 @W() \
15 Bonnisseau (1997) used a similar argument to show the existence of a general
equilibrium with externalities.
28V (), x = pV (;) 2 @V () n int W(). Using (1), one can say that (;x)
is an equilibrium-core allocation, and, p 2  (;x) \ cof'S(;pW(;x)) j S 2
S(pW(;x))g as was to be proved. 
5.4 Proof of Corollary 21.
Assumption PH0: G is convex valued from the quasi-concavity of vi with respect
to the rst variable, non-empty since from the denition of VS, for all  2 , for
all x 2 @VN(), there exists 0 2  such that x  (vi(0
i;i))i. G is clearly an upper
semi-continuous set-valued mapping from the continuity of the mappings vi and pN.
Assumption PH1: Since Fi is non-empty valued for all i 2 N and from the bal-
ancedness Assumption, taking the balanced family (fig;i 2 N) one can prove the
non-emptiness of . Now, the lower-semi continuity and closed graph assumption
of the set-valued mappings VS, S 2 N, are proved.
(l.s.c.) For all  2  a sequence converging to  2 , we show that, for all
x 2 VS(), there exists a sequence (x) converging to x with x 2 VS() for  large
enough. Since x 2 VS(), there exists 0 2 FS() such that xi  vi(0
i;i), i 2 S.
Since FS is lower semi-continuous, there exists a sequence (0) converging to 0
with 0 2 FS() for  large enough. Then, from the continuity of the mapping vi,
one has vi(0
i ;
i ) tends to vi(0
i;i), i 2 S. Let T be a subset of S such that for
each i 2 T one has xi = vi(0
i;i). Now, it suces to take x
i = vi(0
i ;), i 2 T,
and x
i = xi, i 2 S n T. This ends the proof.
(closed graph) Let () be a sequence converging to , and show that if x 2 VS()
converges to x 2 I RN, then x 2 VS(). For all   0, there exists 0 2 FS()
such that x
i  vi(0
i ;). Since FS is upper-semi continuous with compact values,
FS() is compact. Then, the sequence (0) remains in a compact. So taking a
subsequence if we need to, one can say that (0) tends to an element  2 FS().
Taking the limit and from the continuity of the mappings vi, one gets 0 2 FS()
such that xi  vi(0
i;) for all i 2 S, that is to say that x 2 VS(), as was to be
proved.
Remark now, that from a well known argument relying on the quasi-concavity of
the functions vi(:;i), the balancedness condition given in (5) is equivalent the bal-
ancedness (in Boehm's sense) of the game (V ();VS()S2N) for each  2 . This
fact is used in the two paragraphs below.
We check that Assumption PH2 holds true. Let S 2 N. The family fS;(fig)i= 2Sg is a
balanced family. Let (;x) 2 Gr VS, since Fi() is non-empty, there exist i 2 Fi(),
i = 2 S. Let x0 be dened by x0
i = xi, i 2 S and x0
i = vi(i;i), i = 2 S. Clearly, x0 2
VS()\(\i= 2SVfig()). From the balancedness of the game, x0 2 V (). Consequently,
from the compactness of  and the continuity of vi, i 2 N, there exists m() such
that x0  m()1, hence xi  m(), i 2 S.
29The parameterized collection of games is payos-dependent balanced. Indeed, for
each S 2 N, we let 'S be the constant mapping equal to mS and   = 'N. Let
(;x) be in Gr @W, such that cof'S(;x) j S 2 S(x)g \  (;pV (;x)) 6= ;, one
can easily show that the family S(x) is balanced. Then, from (5), one deduces that
x 2 V (), as required. 
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